Iraqi Prime Minister Mohamed Shia Sudani will lead a high-profile delegation to Washington, DC in mid-April, marking his first visit to the White House since taking office in October 2022. The delegation includes key ministers of petroleum, finance, trade and power. The central bank governor was also accompanied by five Iraqi businessmen. Sudani’s seven-day visit to the United States includes meeting with President Joe Biden in the Oval Office on April 15. He will consult with American companies, the Iraqi community and think tanks in Washington before heading to Houston to work with American energy companies.
Agenda of Mr. Sudani’s visit
The delegation will discuss bilateral security, trade, economic, energy and cultural relations, with a focus on the US military presence in Iraq and US Treasury sanctions. These talks are expected to focus primarily on military and sanctions issues.
The Shiite Coordination Framework, which includes Shiite political groups and militias with strong hostility toward the United States and its allies, is pressuring Sudani to prioritize these issues. They perceive the US military as a threat, and Treasury sanctions have had a serious impact on these anti-American financial networks.
The US sanctions were triggered by the misappropriation of US dollars by Iraqi banks and individuals linked to the Coordination Framework.
The US sanctions were triggered by the misappropriation of US dollars by Iraqi banks and individuals linked to the Coordination Framework. These organizations have greatly supported adversaries of the US government such as Iran, Syria, and Russia by funneling huge amounts of money from Iraq to the aforementioned countries, thereby circumventing sanctions.
If the negotiations are successful, Baghdad and Washington are expected to meet the demands of pro-Iranian groups and either develop a schedule for the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq or agree to a new framework for the U.S. military mission in the country. But such agreements could come at a price, with sanctions on blacklisted banks potentially eased in exchange for flexibility in managing the U.S. military presence. But this would mean giving these groups more financial power, which would lead to increased political and military influence and pose a long-term threat to U.S. strategic interests and its allies. .
But if the Biden administration fails to address the persistent attacks by the Coordination Framework on Iraq’s post-2003 political framework that re-centers political and economic power in Baghdad, the United States could be drawn into Iraq again. be.
iraq division
The Kurdistan Region, once a powerful political, diplomatic, economic and energy force, is now paralyzed. Facing multiple crises, partially caused by Baghdad’s unfavorable policies and decisions of the Iraqi Supreme Court, sometimes exacerbated by the indifference of the international community, which have a major impact on the well-being of ordinary Kurds. .
The Coordination Framework, under the watchful eye of Prime Minister Sudani’s government, has consistently sought to recentralize power at the expense of its partners in Washington. The Baghdad Supreme Court’s ruling against Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oil exports has already cost Erbil and international oil companies more than $11 billion in economic losses, plunging Kurdistan into unprecedented economic turmoil. Additionally, Iraqi courts have dissolved the Kurdish parliament and provincial assemblies, stripped the parliamentary seats held by Kurdistan’s minorities since 1992, and revoked the Kurdistan Region’s High Election Commission’s authority to oversee parliamentary elections. More recently, it has interfered in the administrative and budget affairs of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. It supported the Kurdish region by instructing the Iraqi Ministry of Finance to cover the salaries of KRG employees, another step that undermines the KRG’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Kurds.
The Sunni community has also become a new victim of the Iraqi judiciary. Last November, the Federal Supreme Court expelled Sunni speaker Mohamed al-Harbousi from parliament on fraud charges. Mr. Halbousi resigned, even though he deemed the ruling unconstitutional. Many attribute this action to pro-Iranian factions within the Iraqi government who perceived Halbousi as a threat. Sunni attempts to replace Khalbousi have been hampered by internal divisions exacerbated by Shiite interference. The systematic approach of the Coordination Framework shows no intention to cede legislative control to Sunnis. Sunnis and Kurds are becoming increasingly marginalized as Shiites come to dominate all branches of government.
In Iraq, on the other hand, the judiciary appears to have a fairly lenient attitude toward Shia individuals involved in the Coordination Framework.
In Iraq, on the other hand, the judiciary appears to have a fairly lenient attitude toward Shia individuals involved in the Coordination Framework. Specifically, the Court of Cassation in Baghdad acquitted and reinstated Ahmed Hamdawi al-Kinani, a former police officer in Iraq’s interior ministry who appeared to have been under political influence. Al-Kinani was convicted of the 2020 murder of Hisham al-Hishami, a prominent academic and security expert known for his outspoken criticism of Shiite militias, and was sentenced to death in 2023. was receiving.
Sudani has sought to present himself as a leader capable of independent decision-making for Iraq, but he also has the confidence to take on the challenges posed by influential leaders within the coordination framework. They feel that political and public support is not as strong as they need to survive. Therefore, he is more vulnerable to political pressure.
The dynamics of intra-Shiite competition are a little known parallel to the need for a somewhat independent and internationally attractive technocratic figure who can support Iraq’s relations with the West and promote Iraq’s interests. This often paves the way for underserved Shiite politicians to enter this role. Mr Sudani followed in the footsteps of his predecessors and was chosen as a consensus candidate, supported by a coordination framework to reflect their interests. This support is rooted in the less favorable perception that the real power players in the coalition are seen as less attractive, especially by Western standards.
Prime Minister Sudani has several positive qualities that have made him an outstanding leader in post-2003 Iraq. Unlike his predecessors, he spent his entire life in Iraq. His path to power began as the mayor of Amara, giving him an organic and intimate understanding of Iraq’s political and social landscape. His government’s policies have prioritized serving the public, and he has shown a willingness to work with the KRG on important issues such as finance and oil.
In terms of foreign policy, Sudan has strengthened diplomatic and trade relations and maintained balanced relations with neighboring countries, including the Gulf Arab states. Perhaps most notable was his firm stance on Iran, condemning Tehran’s missile attack on Erbil. No wonder, then, that a recent Gallup poll ranked him the most likable prime minister of the past decade.
Long-term prospects and challenges
Mr. Sudani’s positive personality has sparked a wave of euphoria in Washington and among his advisers, reinforcing the optimism surrounding his political trajectory. In his private life, confidence in his future prospects is steadily increasing. They aim to turn the upcoming White House visit into a cutting-edge propaganda campaign to portray Sudani as a respected Iraqi politician on the world stage. The goal is to make this trip a pivotal moment and lay the foundation for a campaign in the 2025 parliamentary elections.
While Washington may see this as a strategic move to reduce the influence of pro-Iranian forces in Iraq and relieve Sudan of pressure, this blueprint is more than just reckless. It poses a direct threat to US strategic interests. While this approach may provide the illusion of security and success in the short term, it ultimately sets the stage for instability.
By investing so much in a single person, Sudani, the United States is inadvertently alienating allies and emboldening adversaries.
By investing so much in a single person, Sudani, the United States is inadvertently alienating allies and emboldening adversaries. This once-lauded strategy, championed by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in 2018, painted him as a hero, a beacon of hope for Iraq and a staunch ally of the West. But despite these grand predictions, when Mr. Abadi’s election loss shattered those illusions, a harsh reality emerged and Washington was disappointed. Worse, it had the unintended consequence of empowering anti-American forces and galvanizing their determination to seize control of Iraq’s institutions. Subsequent elections only strengthened anti-American sentiment and consolidated power among traditional Western opponents in Baghdad.
Iraq needs the support of foreign sponsors to achieve stability. Washington is well-positioned to play this role with a pragmatic strategy that requires a minimal footprint. This will require prioritizing investments in entities aligned with American values and purposes. Such an approach would include strengthening alliances with Kurds, Sunnis, and some moderate Shiites who prioritize Iraq’s interests. Doing so would restore a much-needed balance of power in Baghdad and prevent the emergence of despotic centralized authority.
No political system is perfect, but the consensus governance model and balanced political climate in Baghdad since 2003 deserve credit for preventing Iraq from becoming a regional destructive force and a source of threat to its people. . However, recent trends toward centralization in Iraq carry significant risks and far-reaching implications. It could exacerbate Iraq’s authoritarian tendencies and pose a serious threat to its people and regional stability. Moreover, this development could divert important Western strategic resources away from regions such as Ukraine and East Asia, benefiting America’s rivals. Washington should take these developments seriously.
The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Wilson Center.
